Enrique “Ric” Prado, a CIA veteran, says the Bill Clinton administration rejected proposals to neutralize him years before the attacks
Enrique “Ric” Prado was part of the CIA’s first unit specifically dedicated to addressing the threat posed by Osama bin Laden.
Collage / Ric Prado / National Archives Catalog /.gov
MIAMI.- The declassification of dozens of intelligence reports on Osama bin Laden has once again placed under scrutiny the warnings received by the administrations of Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
The documents, including reports contained in the President's Daily Briefs (PDB), show that U.S. intelligence had known for years about Bin Laden's intentions to attack targets inside the United States and had even considered scenarios involving aircraft and hijackings.
In statements to Diario Las Américas, Enrique “Ric” Prado, a former senior official with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), said the information now made public confirms a reality he witnessed from inside the intelligence community: there were opportunities to act against Bin Laden before Al Qaeda carried out the attacks that killed nearly 3,000 people on September 11, 2001.
Prado was a founding member of the CIA's first unit specifically dedicated to the threat posed by Osama bin Laden and later served as Chief of Operations at the Agency's Counterterrorist Center.
One of the declassified documents is a September 10, 1998, report stating that Bin Laden's preferred option was to attack the United States on its own soil, particularly Washington. The report also indicated the possibility that Al Qaeda could use an aircraft loaded with explosives against a U.S. city.
Another presidential intelligence report, dated December 4, 1998, stated that members of Bin Laden's network had received training to carry out aircraft hijackings. The document also revealed that conspirators had evaded security controls during a test at an unidentified New York airport.
The warnings continued during the George W. Bush administration. A PDB, or presidential daily brief, dated August 6, 2001, informed the president about suspicious activities inside the United States consistent with preparations for hijackings or other attacks. In fact, in the weeks before September 11, the FBI was conducting approximately 70 investigations related to Bin Laden inside the country.
The CIA released 71 presidential intelligence reports covering the period from early 1998 through the day after the attacks. Sixty-nine of those documents had not previously been declassified.
Prado offers a relevant perspective on that period because he was directly involved in the CIA's initial efforts to confront the threat.
In January 1996, Prado and Michael Scheuer, together with a small team of officers, launched the CIA unit dedicated to studying Bin Laden's activities. According to Prado, by late 1997 the Agency had gathered extensive intelligence on the terrorist's activities.
The former officer maintains that, despite the intelligence gathered, the Bill Clinton administration did not allow operational proposals aimed at neutralizing Bin Laden to move forward.
“In January 1996, Michael Scheuer and I, along with a small but dedicated team, started CIA's Bin Ladin Taskforce (AKA Alec Station). With growing intel and first hand information from Billy Waugh, by late 1997 we had a plethora of intel on what Bin Ladin was up to,” Prado said in a statement he expressly authorized to be made public.
Sadly, he added, “the then administration refused to act on our intel and refused to authorize our operational plans to take UBL down.”
Prado's experience gives him a unique perspective on the evolution of the Al Qaeda threat. Born in Cuba, he left the island as a minor as part of Operation Pedro Pan and later built a 24-year career at the CIA.
He served as an operations officer in six overseas posts and participated in paramilitary and counterterrorism operations. In addition to being part of the first unit dedicated to confronting Bin Laden, he was Chief of Operations at the Counterterrorist Center during the September 11 attacks. By the time he retired, he had attained the rank of Senior Intelligence Service-2 (SIS-2).
On September 11, 2001, Prado was serving as Chief of Operations at the Counterterrorist Center. The war on terrorism that followed also carried a personal cost for him: in his testimony, he remembers three friends and colleagues whom he later lost.
“It is a heavy burden of guilt for me and many of my colleagues. Insult to injury, I was Chief of Operations at CIA's Counterterrorist Center (CTC) that infamous day. Here are but three friends I lost in the GWOT: John O'Neil, Mike Spann, Jennifer Mathews.”
Although the newly released documentation does not directly establish that U.S. authorities knew in advance about the specific plot ultimately carried out on September 11, it does provide a detailed picture of the volume and nature of the information circulating at the highest levels of government: Bin Laden wanted to carry out attacks inside the United States; Washington was among the potential targets; members of his network had received training related to aircraft hijackings; and analysts had even warned about the possibility of using an aircraft loaded with explosives against a U.S. city.
Some of the material, which remains redacted, describes various threats and scenarios considered by intelligence services during those years.
For Prado, the issue goes beyond what the intelligence community knew. He questions the political decisions that were made, and those that were not made, based on that information.
Twenty-five years after the terrorist attacks that forever changed the United States' approach to security, these documents reopen one of the most painful wounds in the country's recent history and raise questions about the actions of Presidents Clinton and Bush in the fight against terrorism.
FUENTE: CIA / National Archives Catalog / National Archives / FOX News / The Wall Street Journal / PBS
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